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Excitable Speech: Judith Butler, Mae West, and Sexual Innuendo 





Working with Judith Butler's Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, this essay pursues 
a series of questions on the performativity of speech acts, using sexual innuendo as an example. 
As performed by the provocative American playwright and classic Hollywood film star, Mae 
West, sexual innuendo provides an instance of “excitable speech” that allows for the exploration 
of speech as a site of political resistance. The questions that frame this discussion are as follows: 
How are vulnerability and agency produced in speech? What are the foreclosures or censors at 
work in producing speech and the speaking subject? What constitutes the “force” of the 
performative speech act? How is the speech act repeatable? And do these conditions leave room 
for Butler's notion of linguistic agency, where the speech act works to undermine linguistic 
conventions through resignification? Finally, the essay offers queer readings of Mae West in 
order to demonstrate the concept of “discursive performativity,” which underpins Butler's 
argument. 
 
KEY WORDS: speech acts; sexual innuendo; performativity; linguistic agency; Judith Butler; 





Submitted to International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies, Volume 6, 2001 
  
 2 
What is so perilous, then, in the fact that people speak, and that their speech proliferates? 
Where is the danger in that? (Michel Foucault, 1972)  
Is that a gun in your pocket, or are you just glad to see me? (Mae West, 1978)  
Mae West, American playwright, screenwriter, and classic Hollywood film star, became a figure 
of both controversy and popularity in the 1920s with the pro- duction of her three off-Broadway 
plays titled “Sex” (1926), “The Drag” (1927), and “The Pleasure Man” (1928). The relatively 
overt sexual content and homo- sexual characters and narratives of West’s plays aroused 
criminal charges of ob- scenity, indecency, and immorality against West and her theatre crews, 
indicted by the Grand Jury of the county of New York (West, 1997, p. 205). Censorship and 
celebrity followed West through her film career beginning in the 1930s and lasting until the 
1970s, her television and radio appearances from the 1930s to the 1950s, and her return to the 
theatre in the 1940s.  
The brazen, buxom blonde West is famous for her sexual innuendo. With lines such as “Anytime 
you got nothing to do—and lots of time to do it—come on up” (My Little Chickadee, 1940), she 
established herself as a sharp-witted, provocative, and transgressive parleuse. Her suggestive 
quips are still, irresistibly, repeated in various commercial and colloquial forms. To date, 
however, there has been little written explicitly about the connection of this kind of “irresistible 
repeatability” to the performativity of speech acts. In this essay, the example of West’s 
performative sexual innuendo becomes a particularly irresistible occasion through which sexual 
innuendo and its performative repeatability are explored.  
My discussion takes as its point of departure Judith Butler’s Excitable Speech: A Politics of the 
Performative (1997). In this work, Butler investigates the impact of speech acts, and the qualities 
and conditions that render speech acts felici- tous (successful)—whether injurious or pleasing. 
As well, Butler observes the social constraints and regulatory norms that condition our struggle 
for legitimacy as speaking subjects. She argues that these conditions constitute the speaking 
subject as vulnerable in the production of speech. Next to this, however, she carves out a theory 
of linguistic agency that rests upon the notion of “discursive performativity”—that speech has 
the potential to resignify meaning and context against regulatory norms. In this spirit, Butler 
offers an account of speech as a site of agency and political resistance for the subject in 
discourse.  
Working alongside Butler, this essay pursues a series of questions on the performativity of 
speech acts, using sexual innuendo as an example. Demonstrated by Mae West, sexual innuendo 
provides an instance of “excitable speech” to explore the possibility of speech as a site of 
political resistance. The questions that frame this discussion are as follows: How are 
vulnerability and agency produced in speech? What are the foreclosures or censors at work in 
producing speech and the speaking subject? What constitutes the “force” of the performative 
speech act? How is the speech act repeatable? And last, do these conditions leave room for 
Butler’s notion of linguistic agency, as underpinned by a “discursive performativity,” where the 
speech act works to undermine linguistic conventions through resignification?  
LINGUISTIC VULNERABILITY, LINGUISTIC AGENCY  
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Too many girls follow the line of least resistance—but a good line is hard to resist. (Mae 
West, 1936, as referenced in West, 1975)  
While as individuals, we use language to compliment, seduce, demean, and dispute others, we 
are simultaneously vulnerable to the other’s address. It is in both the agency and vulnerability 
accorded to us through the relation of address that we are constituted as subjects in discourse. 
Butler (1997) calls this Althusserian notion the “linguistic condition of survivable subjects,” 
where “[o]ne comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the 
other” (p. 5). Essentially, recognition by others through verbal address legitimates our 
participation in discourse as agents of speech. We are not, however, “free agents,” so to speak, 
because we are vulnerable in another sense to the regulatory norms and conventions of language.  
Some theorists suggest that we are vulnerable to the norms and conventions of language or 
speech as a prior condition of becoming social, speaking subjects. Lacanians, in particular, argue 
that our entrance into the world of “speakability” requires a foreclosure (refusal or denial) of the 
“unspeakable”—those utterances that exceed the bounds of social norms (Butler, 1997, p. 135). 
The speaking subject must practice this foreclosure in order to emerge as a legitimate and 
intelligible participant in the Symbolic Order.3 Here, as Butler (1997) notes, “unspeakability” 
becomes a condition of subject formation (p. 135); for what we are not allowed to say is, 
arguably, as formative as what we do say. To speak the unspeakable, then, results in social 
sanction or penalty and the risk of one’s status as a legitimate participant in speech (Butler, 1997, 
p. 133).  
Mae West, known for her sexually “aggressive” language and racy puns, transgressed both 
hegemonic American middle-class values and gendered filmic conventions that normalized 
passive female subjectivity. These transgressions re- sulted in the censorship of West’s work, 
and further inflamed an already heated campaign against the representation of “crime” and “sex” 
in Hollywood movies as enforced, specifically, by the Motion Picture Production Code of 1934 
(Curry, 1996, p. 46). It was evident that West’s style of provocative speech, especially as she 
insisted on sex as both pleasurable and economically beneficial for women, was considered to be 
offensive by the censor’s standards. So while West may have made significant gains for sexual 
expression and for representations of women’s sexual agency, she was simultaneously the target 
of industry regulations that suc- ceeded, at least in part, to restrict her creative genius and 
threaten her legitimacy as a mainstream performer.  
As made apparent by West’s catch-22, Butler (1997) is concerned with the kind of linguistic 
agency that can be had if subjects themselves are inextricably formed within the restrictive and 
regulatory conditions of language:  
If we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes and conditions any 
decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were, by its prior power 
. . . And how, if at all, does linguistic agency emerge from this scene of enabling 
vulnerability? (p. 2).  
This question might be reframed another way for our present example: If “Mae West,” as a 
cultural icon, is necessarily formed within the restrictive censors of the American entertainment 
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industry, how is West’s risque ́ performance effec- tive, if at all? Or, what allowed Mae West to 
be popular, even irresistible, in the face of insulting cultural critics and public organizations that 
fought to have her performances banned from public viewing? To approach these questions, I 
inves- tigate more closely how language constitutes the subject through restriction and 
foreclosure.  
FORECLOSURE AND THE SPEAKING SUBJECT  
Censorship made me. (Mae West, in Jennings, 1971, p. 6).  
Foreclosure can be understood as a forced loss or an exclusionary restriction— a shutting out of 
certain realities or possibilities. In regards to speech, we might think of foreclosure as a kind of 
censorship. This kind of censorship, however, does not happen after speech has happened (like 
the banning of Mae West’s plays/films/interviews after their initial showings); this censorship 
happens prior to speech, determining the conditions of speakability (Butler, 1997, p. 41). In other 
words, foreclosure conditions the very emergence of the speaking subject upon her/his initial 
entry into the discursive world and limits her/his agency in speech.  
Freud’s (1915) account of the psyche provides a helpful model for under- standing foreclosure. 
For Freud, the unconscious is a kind of censor. It works primarily to repress desires and 
impulses, to keep desires and impulses away from consciousness, particularly those that threaten 
the ego’s idealized sense of self. However, not only does the unconscious censor consciousness, 
a prior censorship is exercised upon the unconscious itself. The censorship at work here is a kind 
of foreclosure—for this prior censoring of the unconscious effectively shuts out certain 
possibilities for both the unconscious and the conscious. Butler (1997a) notes that Freud’s 
distinction between the repression of thoughts from entering consciousness and the foreclosure 
exercised upon the unconscious is significant here: That which is repressed (from 
consciousness), Freud insists, might once have lived apart from its prohibition (and later 
censored through prohibition). In the foreclosure exercised upon the unconscious, however, 
desire has been rigor- ously, pre-emptively lost from the start (Freud, 1915, p. 23).  
Freud’s analysis can be extended to explain the way that psychic foreclosure finds its expression 
in speech. When the subject speaks, she/he always does so by excluding, censoring, and rejecting 
ideas and meanings. This is not a solely conscious or cognitive effort but, largely, an 
unconscious process of both foreclo- sure and repression as played out in the psyche. That 
speech is unconscious of its foreclosures means that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the 
utterance of the speech act is not necessarily a statement of truth but, rather, a mode of indirect 
access to what speech cannot possibly say out loud (Felman, 1992). This means that while it 
remains unsaid, the unspeakable or what is foreclosed is still present in the speech act, albeit as 
unconscious to both the speech act and its speaker.  
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1999) also offers an account of foreclosure that is helpful here. 
Spivak maintains Lacan’s (interpretation of Freud’s) notion of foreclosure as a barring or 
blocking of ideas, but extends this analysis to address, specifically, the barring of certain 
subjectivities from intelligibility. Effectively, Spivak argues that the production of the white 
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Western subject is achieved through the foreclosure of the “native informant” (p. 6) as typified 
by the subaltern woman. For Spivak, the sense of foreclosure at work in this production is,  
[t]he sense brought to the fore by Lacan, . . . [which is to be found] for instance, in [what] 
Freud writes . . . [about] “a much more energetic and successful kind of defence. Here, 
the ego rejects [verwirft] the incompatible idea together with the affect and behaves as if 
the idea had never occurred to the ego at all” (p. 4, emphasis in original).  
Spivak parallels Freud’s notion of foreclosure by the ego with the way in which white Western 
subjectivity (and discourse) rejects the idea of non-Western or sub- altern women. Subaltern 
women are excluded as if they never existed at all, treated as incompatible with an idealized 
western liberal-humanist notion of subjectivity, while the fact that the chimera of the white 
western subject relies upon subaltern women’s exclusion for its own fac ̧ade, goes 
unacknowledged.  
An example of the kind of foreclosure Spivak describes is inherent to the production of Mae 
West as a North American cultural icon. Particularly in West’s films, African American actors 
appear in the roles of maid and/or attendant (in various respects) to West’s character. The 
characters played by these actors are gen- erally to be found at West’s disposal as (female) 
domestic servants or (male) exotic servants. Their agency as subjects in speech is, for the most 
part, denied. Instead, their presence serves to reinforce West’s position as the (sexually and 
racially) dominant figure of the scene. Ramona Curry (1996) observes this relationship:  
. . . the maids clearly augment West’s featured—and fetishized—status, enhancing the 
star’s aura of power and sexual allure through their roles as servants and through their 
vividly contrasting visual presence, their dark skin, hair, and costumes setting off West’s 
shimmering bleached-blonde whiteness (p. 87).  
Curry’s analysis shows that, in fact, West’s character is effectual precisely be- cause certain 
linguistic possibilities have been shut out and pushed underground— namely the linguistic 
agency of racialized “others.” This foreclosed agency, then, becomes part of the unsaid of West’s 
jokes and, arguably, part of what gives her jokes their conventional force.  
As the above example shows, foreclosure is not only restrictive—it is also pro- ductive since it 
determines what constitutes intelligible speech and the possibility of agency upon this 
foreclosure. In chapter 4, “Implicit Censorship and Discursive Agency,” Butler (1997) elaborates 
on Foucault’s idea of how censorship produces the conditions of discursive agency for the 
speaking subject: “[C]ensorship is not merely restrictive and privative, that is, active in depriving 
subjects of the freedom to express themselves in certain ways, but also formative for subjects and 
the legitimate boundaries of speech” (p. 132). When West (1975) claims “I wasn’t conscious of 
being sexy until the censors got after me” (p. 87), and “Censorship made me” (West as quoted in 
Jennings, 1971, p. 6), she points to this constitu- tive power of censorship as it contributes to the 
reception of her speech and the production of her image as a cultural icon. Curry (1996) 
comments further on the relationship of censorship to West’s success:  
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Much of West’s comedic appeal—like that of comedy more generally—derived precisely 
from her violating social mores in performance, even to the point of inviting censorship. 
Audience knowledge that West’s performances had provoked censorship augmented her 
comic reception, for it alerted listeners and viewers to expect and catch possible sexual 
implications in almost every line and gesture. The threat of censorship enhanced, even 
yielded, the joke (p. 81).  
For West, censorship worked not only to reinforce her image as a giftedly defiant performer; it 
actually reiterated the force of her jokes.  
SPEECH ACTS AND THE “FORCE” OF THE PERFORMATIVE  
It isn’t what I do, but how I do it. It isn’t what I say, but how I say it, and how I look 
when I do it and say it (Mae West, 1975, p. 43).  
J. L. Austin (1962) wrote that performative speech acts are utterances that produce action or 
perform an operation in their speaking (p. 32). Performatives work through the power of citation, 
meaning that they cite or invoke certain linguis- tic conventions thereby acquiring the power and 
legitimacy of social law (Butler, 1993, p. 225). “Felicitous” performatives are speech acts that 
achieve their in- tended actions or operation through this citation. The citation of conventions 
and social law accords them a certain “force” that is recognized by the recipient(s) of the speech 
act as meaningful and legitimate, securing their success. On the other hand, “infelicitous” 
performatives or “misfires,” to use Austin’s (1962) words, fail to achieve their intended action 
and are experienced as “void or without effect” (p. 16). For instance, sexual innuendo that fails 
to be experienced as a sexual hint is rendered impotent or infelicitous by this misrecognition.  
Austin (1962) makes a further distinction between “illocutionary” speech acts and 
“perlocutionary” speech acts. In the case of the illocutionary speech act, the saying is itself a 
kind of doing, or, the speech is a performance of an act in itself (p. 99). For example, “I would 
like to apologize,” conventionally, performs an apology—it does not only suggest an intended 
apology, as its literal meaning states, indeed, it is the apology. Distinctly, the perlocutionary 
speech act achieves certain effects by saying something (p. 121). Althusser’s (1971) famous 
example is the hailing of the pedestrian by the police officer’s shout, “Stop!” Here, it is assumed 
that the effect of the officer’s shout is experienced after it has been heard. While the force of the 
illocutionary speech act is set in motion, simultaneous with its saying, by its situatedness within 
particular socially affirmed linguistic conventions (in the first instance, within the conventions of 
apology), the perlocutionary act is set in motion mainly by the subsequent actions it incites—in 
the second instance, by the pedestrian stopping and turning towards the call of the police officer.  
Butler insists that Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocu- tionary speech acts is 
significant. Particularly, Butler (1997) is interested in his notion that the illocutionary speech act 
produces its effects in the same time as its utterance. For Butler, this distinction does not take 
account of how the meaning achieved by the speech act is produced historically and 
contextually—beyond the single moment of its articulation. She proposes that it is not only the 
conventional illocutionary force that renders a performative speech act felicitous, it is the rep- 
etition of speech that recalls prior acts that gives speech its performative power (p. 20):  
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If a performative provisionally succeeds (and I will suggest that “success” is always and 
only provisional), then it is not because an intention successfully governs the action of 
speech, but only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of 
authority through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices. What 
this means, then, is that a performative “works” to the extent that it draws on and covers 
over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized. In this sense, no term or 
statement can function performatively without the accumulating and dissimulating 
historicity of force (Butler, 1997, pp. 226–227, emphasis in original).  
The performative speech act, then, acquires its force through an accumulation of meaning over 
time, and through its relationship to its immediate discursive/temporal context. This relationship 
between speech and historicity, however, is covered up, hidden through the conventions by 
which speech is mobilized—through its articu- lation by a speaker. Ironically, it is the repeated 
stifling of constitutive historicity in speech that allows the performative speech act to be 
understood, yet this prevents us from knowing the historicity of speech.  
REPETITION AND “DISCURSIVE PERFORMATIVITY”  
Women with “pasts” interest men because men hope that history will repeat itself (Mae 
West, 1975, p. 50).  
Our simultaneous vulnerability and agency in language presents an ironic scenario: the speaking 
subject depends on restrictive regulatory norms and the aforementioned foreclosures in order to 
exercise linguistic agency. So, each time the subject “enters” speech, she/he repeats these 
foreclosures, thereby reinforcing them, her/his dependency on them, and their constitutive 
restrictions:  
If the subject is produced in speech through a set of foreclosures, then this founding and 
formative limitation sets the scene for the agency of the subject. Agency becomes possi- 
ble on the condition of such a foreclosure. . . . Because the action of foreclosure does not 
take place once and for all[, however,] it must be repeated to reconsolidate its power and 
efficacy....Thus, the subject who speaks within the sphere of the speakable implicitly 
reinvokes the foreclosure on which it depends and, thus, depends on it again (Butler, 
1997, pp. 139–140).  
What Butler effectively argues in the above passage is that the restrictive norms and foreclosures 
of speakability are maintained through repetition—a repetition performed by the speaking 
subject who is compelled to repeat those foreclosures. According to this reading, foreclosure and 
regulatory norms are not singular or final events; rather, they are “reiterated effect[s] of a 
structure” (Butler, 1997, p. 138). On the double assumption, then, that foreclosure is not a final 
event and that it is the speaker who must reiterate its terms, Butler sees this as an opportunity to 
disrupt the chain of foreclosure’s reiteration. Foreclosure’s impermanence allows a space, 
somewhere between reiterations or repetitions, for the speaker to disrupt the conditions of 
foreclosure by resignifying meaning against or distinct from the terms of its prior usage.  
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There is a second sense, however, in which repetition works in the production of language. 
While in the first sense, repetition works to reiterate foreclosures, in the second sense repetition 
works to accumulate and solidify meaning. In this sense, meaning is constituted through the 
repeated performance of the signifying mark— a process Butler calls “discursive 
performativity.” According to Jacques Derrida (1988), this discursive performativity, the 
repetition of the signifying mark, is inherent to the production of language. Further, the word or 
mark must be flexible enough to be recognized and understood in new and various scenarios, 
beyond its intended receiver, in order to function as a sign within communication. Derrida (1988) 
states: “My communication must be repeatable—iterable—in the absolute absence of the 
receiver or of any empirically determinable collectivity of receivers” (p. 7). In other words, 
speech must be repeated and repeatable in order to work, and this repeatability “presupposes that 
the formula [of the utterance] itself continues to work in successive contexts, that it is bound to 
no context in particular even as . . . it is always found in some context or another” (Butler, 1997, 
p. 147). Speech, then, is never fully constrained or determined by its originating context. Rather, 
speech is transferable from one context to another. And while it never retains exactly the same 
meaning as in previous usages (because of the specific discursive conditions by which it is 
rendered in each subsequent repetition), it retains enough significance in order to be recognizable 
and felicitous in new situations. In fact, recognition of the old meaning in the new context is 
what gives the speech act its intelligibility even when it is resignified as something totally 
different from its original.  
Mae West used material repeatedly and often cited her own dialogue from one performance in 
another (Curry, 1996). These repetitions reinforced West’s omnipresence and “quotability” by 
calling, to the viewer’s attention, her perfor- mances over and over again. That West continues to 
be cited in various commercial and colloquial forms by others also proves her irresistible 
repeatability. One case that demonstrates this is as follows:  
Mae West sees a woman looking at her. West goes up to her and asks, “Is that a puddle 
you’re standing in or are you just glad to see me?” (Curry, 1996, p. xvii).  
This joke, that Curry (1996) suggests circulated among media scholars in the early 1990s, was 
not actually told by West. It is clearly fashioned, however, after West’s most infamous line “Is 
that a gun in your pocket, or are you just glad to see me.” The original, spoken by West’s 
(female) character to a male character, is rewritten here to make the line’s recipient a woman. 
The shift from male-defined desire as signified in the original joke by the gun/erection, gives 
way to a spillover of female (lesbian) desire as signified by the orgasmic puddle left by the 
woman.4 Here, we notice that the substitution of the puddle for the gun is a significant break 
from the meaning of the old joke. The revised joke, however, is not entirely new, for it is still a 
play on the recipient’s obvious desire for West. Further, it is in recognition of the old joke that 
the new joke gains its effectiveness and, I would argue, its ironic sense of humor. What is 
particularly irresistible about repeating/revising Mae West’s sexual innuendo is not only the 
pleasure gained from the recollection of West’s original text, but also the pleasure gained from 
recontextualizing the innuendo with new significance, meaning, and success. As well, the 
revision has undermined the conventions of the original joke, thereby breaking with the 
normative, heterosexual codes and articulations of desire. This is an example of Butler’s (1997) 
“discursive performativity” as it functions as an instrument of resistance: the repetition of the 
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new joke (the puddle joke, in this case) that confounds rather than consolidates the old joke’s 
normative efficacy.  
SEXUAL INNUENDO AND THE PERFORMATIVITY OF THE “UNSAID”  
A joke says what it has to say, not always in few words, but in too few words—that is, in 
words that are insufficient by strict logic or common modes of thought and speech. It 
may even actually say what it has to say by not saying it (Theodor Lipps, as quoted in 
Freud, 1905).  
Between two evils, I always pick the one I never tried before (Mae West, 1936 as 
referenced in West, 1975).  
Sexual innuendo presents an especially interesting and complex case by which to examine 
performative speech acts and the potential of discursive performativity. This is because the 
meaning of sexual innuendo lies not in what is uttered, but rather in the effect of what is unsaid 
or what remains unspoken.5 What is characteristic of sexual innuendo is its capacity for double 
meaning: first, a literal or uttered meaning that is generally non-sexual or platonic and, second, a 
suggested meaning that is characteristically sexual and unsaid. A simultaneity of meaning is thus 
required in order to produce the effect of an innuendo: what is said relies upon the unsaid 
meaning for its sexual suggestion, while the unsaid meaning relies upon the uttered sentence 
meaning for its (albeit indirect) articulation. Thus, the effect of innuendo relies upon the tension 
between the stated and the implied.  
Sexual innuendo might also be characterized as a “double-entendre.” The definition of “double-
entendre” that Freud (1905) gives is of a joke constructed on a double-meaning that relies upon a 
word or words not invoking their “usual” meaning but, rather, in the context of the joke, having a 
“sexual” meaning (p. 75). Speech act theorist John R. Searle (1979) would likely take up sexual 
innuendo as a metaphor or indirect speech act, “[an] utteranc[e] in which the speaker means 
metaphorically something different from what the sentence means literally...” (p. 76). In addition 
to these, we can compare sexual innuendo to the categories of performative speech acts that 
Austin (1962) uses. Is sexual innuendo illocutionary? Does it perform something by its very 
saying? If so, what does it perform? Sex? Or is sexual innuendo better described as 
perlocutionary—that is, causing a certain effect (sexual interest?) by its saying? In the case of 
Mae West’s performance of sexual innuendo, it is most obvious that her provocative speech 
caused great effect, but we could also say that her speech performed and continues to perform 
something in its saying. In a sense, the reiteration of West’s speech performs “Mae West” and 
the complicated nexus of foreclosures and repetitions that typified her comedy. But let us 
examine how sexual innuendo, particularly, achieves its performative success.  
We can start by asking, what constitutes a felicitous sexual innuendo? Or, how does sexual 
innuendo work? In the words of Searle (1979), “[h]ow is it possible for speakers to communicate 
to hearers when speaking metaphorically inasmuch as they do not say what they mean?” (p. 76). 
When West says, “Anytime you got nothing to do—and lots of time to do it—come on up,” how 
does the receiver of her line understand what she means by her invitation to “do it”? At the very 
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least, we can be sure that the performative force of the innuendo is implicit because the 
significance of the act lies in what is unsaid. But, then, how is the unsaid performative?  
For sexual innuendo to “work” or to be felicitous as a performative, it must resonate for the 
receiver with prior acts or signifiers of sexual desire. If it does not, she/he will experience the 
utterance to be platonic or barren of sexual suggestion. If this happens, the innuendo itself is 
infelicitous because it fails to repeat, for the receiver, something familiar enough to make the 
sexual intentions of the innuendo (and the speaker) understood. Note, however, that while sexual 
innuendo must repeat something “prior,” it must not necessarily repeat that prior thing in the 
same way. “Is that a puddle you’re standing in . . .?” does and does not recall its earlier version, 
“Is that a gun in your pocket. . . .?” While the puddle line’s resonance with the earlier version of 
the joke constitutes its repetition, its difference from the earlier joke marks the moment where 
the speech act is resignified. The sexual innuendo could be considered partially resonant, for it 
both does and does not recall prior structures of reference.6 This partial or ambivalent resonance 
is characteristic of all speech acts, however; for any utterance, while it repeats a prior act, never 
does so as precisely the same act.  
THE QUEER WEST: RADICAL RESIGNIFICATIONS  
The best way to learn to be a lady is to see how other ladies do it (Mae West, 1975, p. 
52).  
Queer resignifications are one way that we can imagine “discursive performa- tivity” (Butler, 
1997) functioning as resistance to normative structures in language and discourse. This has been 
shown, for instance, by the queering of West’s “Is that a gun in your pocket . . .?” line (Curry, 
1996, p. xvii). I will push this resig- nification further, however, and turn this innuendo into an 
even queerer one by recontextualizing the terms of the sexual innuendo once again:  
One woman sees another woman looking at her. The first woman goes up to the second 
woman and asks, “Is that a gun in your pocket or are you just glad to see me?”  
The rendition given here presents yet another shift in the joke’s constitutive terms. From the 
earliest version, focused on male desire as signified by the gun/erection, to the puddle version, 
focused on female desire as signified by the orgasmic puddle, this third version features a 
possible “lesbian phallus” as signified by the gun- suspected-to-be-a-dildo or some other form of 
female erection. While this version actually moves closer to the original in terms of its similitude 
of wording, it has turned the original on its head (pun intended) to expose the manipulability of 
the phallus as a strictly male signifier of heterosexual desire and, more generally, to demonstrate 
the transgressability of normative sexual codes through performative discourse.  
A number of West’s jokes offer queer re-readings without having to change the given 
words/terms of her line. “The best way to learn to be a lady is to see how other ladies do it,” 
connotes lesbian sex whether West intended this or not, or the line could be given a gay male or 
drag reading of camp where it suggests advice from one queen to another. “They say gentleman 
prefer blondes, but who says blondes prefer gentlemen?” (West, 1975, p. 49) presents another 
opportunity that I will pursue here. There are several techniques involved in queering this joke. 
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The first requires an understanding of the joke as it was originally intended: West begins with the 
common idiom “gentleman prefer blondes,” which literally suggests that men prefer blonde 
women as sexual objects. By introducing this idiom with the words “They say,” West marks 
“gentleman prefer blondes” as a conventional perception. Her intent, then, is to challenge the 
validity of this convention by reversing the terms as such: “but do blondes prefer gentlemen, or 
perhaps some other kind of (less-gentle) men?” To queer this line takes West’s challenge one 
step further where “who says blondes prefer gentlemen” becomes “who says blondes prefer men 
(at all)?” The queer line both repeats and builds on West’s original undermining of social 
convention, but this time by challenging its heterosexual terms.  
In his analysis of jokes, Freud (1905) observes that often what is unspeak- able, particularly 
criticism of social convention, is articulated through jokes as an undermining of social 
authorities: “the object of the joke’s attack may . . . well be institutions, people in their capacity 
as vehicles of institutions, dogmas of morality or religion, views of life which enjoy so much 
respect that objections to them can only be made under the mask of a joke and indeed of a joke 
concealed by its fac ̧ade” (p. 153, emphasis added). It is in this sense—that the joke functions to 
articulate an otherwise unspeakable criticism of authority—that Mae West is able to make her 
bold and defiant statements, for, arguably, they could neither be articulated nor heard outside of 
her comedic renditions.  
At the same time that West challenges sex, class, and gender conventions, however, she relies 
upon these conventions by invoking them in her performances. Like the strategies of irony and 
parody, West’s comedy must first erect social convention in order to subsequently undermine it. 
This is demonstrated in the op- positional structure of the joke: “They say gentleman prefer 
blondes [convention], but who says blondes prefer gentleman [undermining]?” The strategy used 
here, however, also reveals West’s reinforcement of convention, namely heteronorma- tivity and 
racism, since she forecloses the possibility of same-sex desire or mis- cegenation in the 
blondes/gentleman joke. Only through the foreclosure of certain possibilities, then, is West able 
to set the stage for her own linguistic agency and for the possibility of articulating female sexual 
agency.  
CONCLUSION  
An ounce of performance is worth a pound of promises (Mae West, 1975, p. 71)  
In The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Butler’s (1997a) follow up to Excitable 
Speech (1997), the author questions whether the ambivalent process of “discursive 
performativity”—whereby signification never occurs totally outside of discourse, but always 
within and sometimes against discourse—is capable of effectively subverting those restrictive 
conditions of language and subjectivity: “From a psychoanalytic perspective, . . . we might ask 
whether this possibility of resistance to a constituting or subjectivating power can be derived 
from what is ‘in’ or ‘of’ discourse” (p. 94). In other words, Butler expresses skepticism about the 
possibility of resisting the conventions of speakability from within language. For, as 
demonstrated earlier, the foreclosures that constitute the impossible “outside” of linguistic 
intelligibility also secure our entrance into and intelligibility within discourse as speaking 
subjects. While Butler argues in Excitable Speech (1997) that speech is never fully constrained 
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by its context (thereby allowing the speaker opportunities for agency within speech), speech can 
never be fully constrained by its speaker either. Therefore, while the indeterminacy of language 
allows for certain linguistic possibilities, this same indeterminacy constitutes vulnerability for the 
speaking subject—as speakers we are never guaranteed control of language.  
Next, Butler (1997a) poses an even more difficult question: What does it mean that discourse not 
only produces the domains of the speakable, but is it- self “bounded through the production of a 
constitutive outside: the unspeakable, the unsignifiable?” (p. 94). In other words, what does it 
mean that language is constituted by discursive turns and psychic foreclosures that are ultimately 
un- knowable and incomprehensible to us as speakers and interpreters of discourse? How can we 
know the ways, for instance, by which sexual innuendo is rendered psychically meaningful for 
the participants involved? Or, how can we predict the discursive significance that will be 
attached to the uttering of a sexual innuendo in any particular or specific context? While it is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion to pursue these questions in any depth, what they 
demonstrate is that the performativity of language and the relations between any subject and its 
utterance are ultimately “contingent and radically heterogeneous, as well as . . . contestable” 
(Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 14).  
That the performative speech act is not limited to any single context—indeed that it is 
transferable and contestable through this transferability—also means that speech proliferates 
beyond itself and its own intentions. As Shoshana Felman writes, most often in speech “the 
utterance performs meanings that are not precisely the ones that are stated or, indeed, capable of 
being stated at all” (Felman as quoted in Butler, 1997, p. 10). The potential for the utterance to 
perform meanings other than the ones that are stated is the “danger” Foucault (1972) speaks of 
when he asks, “What is so perilous, then, in the fact that people speak, and that their speech 
proliferates?” (p. 216). For Butler, it is the indeterminacy of discourse that characterizes this 
“proliferation” that allows for the possibility for speech acts to resignify conventional meanings, 
to function as resistance. And if we are to be seduced by Mae West’s clever insistence that “an 
ounce of performance is worth a pound of promises,” performative resignifications will speak 
louder than the words themselves to challenge the normative conditions of speakability.  
NOTES 
1 Graduate Programme in Women’s Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  
2 Correspondence should be directed to Angela Failler, Graduate Programme in Women’s 
Studies, York  
3 The symbolic order, in Lacanian theory, is the social and cultural order in which we live our 
lives as conscious, gendered subjects. It is structured by language and the social institutions that 
language secures (Weedon, 1997, p. 50).  
4 Unless of course the reader interprets the puddle to be a puddle of pee—where West’s female 
admirer is assumed to have uncontrollably peed out of excitement and (platonic) envy.  
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5 Much of this analysis has derived from a reading and comparison of Linda Hutcheon’s (1995) 
Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony.  
6 I owe the articulation of this idea to Sharon Rosenberg in a personal communication.  
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